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"THE DEAD HAND OF THE COMMON LAW"
In the November number of this Journal' there appeared a very
suggestive article by Mr. Justice Young of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire entitled "The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals
and the Lawmaking Function of Courts." The essential soundness
of the fundamental doctrine therein maintained 2 substantially indi-
'(1917) 27 YALE LAW JoUR.NA, .
'That the views of the present writer are in essential harmony with those of
Mr. Justice Young is made fully apparent in "The Law and the Judges"
(January, 19L4) 3 YALE REvIEW, 234. One or two minor differences may be
indicated in passing. The law is indeed an expression of community ideals;
but this truth is in no wise dependent upon the fiction that the community is an
"entity with a mind of its own," a so-called "general mind." (27 YALE LAw
JOURNAL I5.) Such a fiction is to be avoided. Again, the rules adopted by a
community do not always "limit individual freedom of action." (Ibid. 7, 8.)
They may amount to a grant of such freedom. Suppose I tell my neighbor that
he may walk across my lawn. If he exercises this privilege I will have no right
against him. The legal declaration. of his privilege and of my no-right is as
[668]
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COMMENTS
cated by the title, has been admitted by many jurists,$ in spite of some
disapproval and dogmatic assertion to the contrary.' In their actual
decisions, the courts daily demonstrate its soundness, and not infre-
quently a written opinion makes an express admission indicating a
consciousness of the court's function as a lawgiver.
In Rosen v. United States,5 decided January 7, 1918, the Supreme
Court held that a witness was not disqualified by the fact that he had
much a rule of law as was the previously applicable rule that he should not walk
across my lawn.
'Austin, 2 Jurisprudence (3d ed.) 655 denounced "The childish fiction
employed by our judges that judiciary or common law is not made by them,
but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing ... from eternity."
Sir Henry Maine (Ancient Law, 3d Am. ed., ch. 2, p. 31) says: "The fact
that the old rule has been repealed, and that a new one has replaced it, eludes
us, because we are not in the habit of throwing into precise language the legal
formulas which were derived from precedents, so that a change in their tenor is
not unusually detected, unless it is violent orglaring. I shall not now pause to
consider at length the causes which have led English lawyers to acquiesce in
these curious anomalies. Probably it will be found that originally it was the
received doctrine that somewhere, in nubibus or in gremio magistratuum, there
existed a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of English law, of an amplitude
sufficient to furnish principles which would apply to any conceivable combina-
tion of circumstances."
Professor Theodore W. Dwight in his introduction to Maine's Ancient Law
(3d Am. ed., p. xi) said: "Sometimes fiction affects the law without conscious-
ness on the part of the judge. Instances of this are given by Mr. Maine. At
other times, the judiciary cover their intent to alter the law with a thin and
transparent veil of fiction."-
"The whole of the rules of equity, and nine-tenths of the rules of common
law, have in fact been made by the judges." Mellish, L.J. in Allen v. Jackson
(875) 1 Ch. D. 399, 405.
For similar statements, with application in particular instances, see Bohlen,
Cases on Torts, 185, note 3; Terry, -Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law,
secs. io, 11; 3 Bentham, Works, 223; Rafael Altamira, i Cont. Leg. Hist.
Series, 699; Pomeroy, Equity urisp. sec. 69; Baldwin, American Judiciary, pp.
73-77; I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 498; Lefroy, Judge-made Law
(1904) 2o LAw QuAt. REv. 399.
'Lord Kenyon was seldom a conscious innovator. In Ellah v. Leigh (1794)
5 T. R. 682, he said: "I do not think that the courts ought to change the law,
so as to adapt it to the fashion of the times." Again, in Bauerman v. Radenius
(798) 7 T. R. 668, he said: "It is my wish and my comfort to stand super
antiquas vias: I cannot legislate; but by my industry I can discover what my
predecessors have done and I will servilely tread in their steps." That he was
not always so "servile" is indicated in Goodisson v. Nunn (1792) 4 T. R- 76r,
where he went squarely contra to the former cases, saying: "The old cases
cited by the plaintiff's counsel have been accurately stated; but the determina-
tions in them outrage common sense."
Bentham, while fully admitting its existence, lost no opportunity of sneering
at "judge-made law" (e. g. 3 Works, 223, 28o-283; 5 id. 374 n.), a term greatly
liked by Austin, but one ,which he would not adopt because Bentham had made
it "smack of disrespect." (Austin, op. cit. 549.)
'38 Sup. Ct. 163, discussed in 27 YALu LAw JouRNAL 573.
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been convicted of forgery. There is no doubt that such a conviction
was formerly a disqualification at common law and by the law applic-
able in the Federal courts. No Federal statute has ever specifically
changed this former rule. Further, in 1851, the court held that the
competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the United States courts
must be determined by the rules of evidence which were in force in
the respective states when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed.6
After showing that the states have now all departed from this former
rule of disqualification, either by statute or by judicial decision, and
that such departure is based upon sound policy, Mr. Justice Clarke
says: "we conclude that the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789
should no longer be applied." It may be surprising to some to see the
common law referred to as a "dead hand" and to see it deliberately
disregarded by our highest court; but the fact is that the living hand
of the present judge does-not write like the dead hand of the judges
of 1789 or 185i. It may be regarded as a sign of the times that only
two justices dissented in this case.
In the recent case of Bowman v. Secular Society,7 where the pre-
existing rules of law were obviously abandoned by the English House
of Lords, only one judge was so conservative as to dissent. Lord
Finlay, L. C. dissented, saying: "It can never be the duty of a court
of law to begin by inquiring what is the spirit of the age and in
supposed conformity with it to decide what the law is." Of this dis-
senting opinion Sir Frederick Pollock8 says that it "has no worse
fault than that of being a century out of date."
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,' Mr. Justice Holmes said: "I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to
molecular motions."1 0  This statement indicates the limits of judicial
legislation within which the courts usually stay. The judge will not
ordinarily lag much behind the mores of society in its forward march;
but he dare not advance much ahead of them either. At least, he dare
'United States v. Reid (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 361.
7 [1g7] A. C. 4o6. This case holds that it is not illegal to give money for
the promulgation of doctrines opposed to Christianity. It will doubtless be
pleasing to the shade of Thomas Jefferson, who spoke with indignation of "the
most remarkable instance of judicial legislation that has ever occurred in Eng-
lish jurisprudence, or perhaps in any other. It is that of the adoption in mass
of the whole code of another nation and its incorporation into the legitimate
system, by usurpation of the judges alone." He was referring to the supposed
attempt of various judges to make Christianity and the Bible a part of the
common law. See his preface to Jefferson's Reports (Va.).
833 LAw QuART. REV. 302.
'(0917) 37 Sup. Ct 524, discussed in 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL 255.
20 It may be noted that it is by motions such as these that the most thorough-
going changes are effected; it is they that make law look fantastic when it is
"a century out of date."
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not lay down a new rule in direct conflict with the prevailing opinion
of the community. Thus, in the case of Union Trust Co. v. Grosman,"
where it appeared that the legislature of Texas had not yet empowered
a married woman to bind herself to pay the debts of her husband, Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "If the statutes have not gone so far as to enable
a woman to bind her separate property or herself in order to secure
her husband's debts, they prohibit it, and no argument can make it
clearer that the policy of that state is opposed to such an obligation.
It does not help at all to point out the steps in emancipation that have
been taken, and to argue prophetically that the rest is to come. We
have no concern with the future. It has not come yet."
This language indicates that in the particular case the court thought
that the time had not come for judicial legislation. The mores of
Texas in respect to the status of married women would not justify
it. In Rosen v. United States and in Bowman v. Secular Society it
was otherwise.
That the law of the present is what the judges would now decide
and not what they have decided in the past has been clearly stated by
Mr. Justice Holmes. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." In
Hansen v. Grand Trunk Ry.,12 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
in a case where it became necessary to determine the law of Ontario,
said: "The question to be determined as a fact by the trial judge is not
wholly what has been held in some earlier Canadian cases, but what
would be held if the present suit had been brought in that jurisdiction."
This is the very same determination that must be made in cases involv-
ing the law of the local jurisdiction. Of course, we know very well
that the past decisions of the courts will generally have a controlling
weight in making this determination. In such cases the "dead hand"
prevails because the living hand follows the copy.
It has been argued that judicial legislation is much inferior to par-
liamentary legislation in that it must always operate retroactively, while
the latter may and generally does operate only in futuro.1 3 When a
judge lays down a new rule he does so for the purpose of determining
the legal result of a past transaction, and a plausible claim of injustice
can be made where a party to the action is penalized by virtue of a
rule never previously formulated. Even if injustice may occasionally
be done, assuming some non-existent (or at least undemonstrable)
absolute and eternal standard by which to judge, such supposed
injustice is largely unavoidable in human administration. Parlia-
mentary (as well as judicial) legislation has never been and cannot
U (1917) 38 Sup. Ct. iI.
(1917, N. H.) io2 At. 625.
See Austin, op. cit. 673; 5 Bentham, Works, 477.
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be made so clear that he who runs may read-much less understand.
We must be content that our action shall be judged in accordance
with a statute the very existence of which may have been unknown
to us and in accordance with a meaning that is to be determined ex
post facto by the judge. 4 Who can be regarded as blameworthy for
not knowing what laws have been enacted by the numerous and indus-
trious legislatures? We cannot take time enough to read the mighty
statute books and we cannot rely upon their indexes.
Even if statutes could be kept few enough to be known and clear
enough to be understood, they must ever fail to determine multitudes
of cases arising for decision. Only an omniscient legislator can pro-
vide in advance for all future cases.15 That parliamentary legislation
is best that is founded upon and a codification of the previous "inter-
stitial" and "molecular" legislation of the courts.'8
A very large part of legislation must always be ex post facto and it
is this sort of judicial legislation that gives satisfaction. In spite of
occasional outcry, it works. It may sometimes be difficult to decide a
concrete case after it has occurred, but it is far easier than to decide
it in advance in the form of a general rule. By this process we get
better law, law more nearly in harmony with prevailing custom and
desire and with the justice of the present day. A litigant is less likely
to be surprised and pained by a decision based upon rules thus estab-
lished than he is by decisions based upon statutes. Judicial rules, in
new cases as well as in old cases, are drawn from the mores of society
as the judges know them; and they are stated anew in each case with
specific reference to a case the facts of which are historically complete.
The litigant will not be greatly surprised at the mores, because his
daily life is ordered by them and he has helped, generally uncon-
sciously, to make them.
The change and growth of law by such judicial action can never
be avoided. In this respect it is immaterial to what sort of tribunal
the judicial function is delegated. It may be called a court of law or
of equity or of admiralty, a merchants' court or a board of arbitration.
"The French legal historian, Brissaud, in i Cont. Leg. Hist. Series, 29, says:
"One fact is universally recognized and inevitable, namely, that the application
of the law by the judiciary furnishes a thousand opportunities to modify the
rule of law, and that sometimes the judge even succeeds in paralyzing the will
of the legislator." See also Baldwin, American Tudiciary, 83, 84; 3 Bentham,
Works, 28o-283; Austin, op. cit. 678.
'Austin (op. cit. 686) thus quotes Lord Mansfield: "Cases of law depend
upon occasions which give rise to them. All occasions do not arise at once. A
statute very seldom can take in all cases. Therefore the common law that
works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountains of justice, is superior
to an act of parliament"
"Austin (op. cit. 681) says: "The judiciary law is, as it were, the nucleus
around which the statute law is formed."
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COMMENTS
In all alike the judicial function is legislative as well, and with nothing
less would we be content.
A. L. C.
TESTAMENTARY POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
Can a will be so drawn as to provide that a power of appointment
created by it may be effectively exercised by a person who does not
survive the testator? This unusual and complex problem was pre-
sented to the New York Court of Appeals in In re Fowles' Will (1918,
N. Y.) 118 N. E. 611.1
In contemplatioil of sailing on the Lusitania Mr. and Mrs. Fowles
executed their several wills. By -his will Mr. Fowles made his wife
donee of a power of appointment and provided: "In the event that
my said wife and myself should die simultaneously or under such
circumstances as to render it difficult or impossible to determine who
predeceased the other, I hereby declare it to be my will that it shall be
deemed that I shall have predeceased my said wife, and that this my
will and any and all of its provisions shall be construed on the assump-
tion and basis that I shall have predeceased my said wife." Mrs.
Fowles by her will attempted to exercise the power of appointment.
Husband and wife were lost at sea May 7, 1915, with the destruction
of the ill-fated vessel. There was nothing to show that either sur-
vived the other. Hence the question arose whether the attempt by
Mrs. Fowles to exercise the power was effective.
Two rules of law were claimed to 'stand in the way.: (I) the prin-
ciple that a power created by will lapses if the donee of the power
dies before the donor's will becomes operative by his death ;2 and (2)
the rule (in force in New York and Connecticut) which forbids a
testator to incorporate by reference extrinsic documents testamentary
in character and not executed by the testator in accordance with the
statutory formalities.3 All of the judges admitted the validity and
applicability of the first principle. But a majority of the court held
that Mr. Fowles had expressed by the provision above quoted the
intention to avoid the consequences of a lapse of the power, and that
such intention should be given effect by incorporating into his will
those terms of Mrs. Fowles' will by which she attempted to exercise
the power.'
"The case in the lower courts is reported in In re Fowles' Will (i916, Surr.)
95 Misc. 48, I58 N. Y. Supp. 456; In re Fowles' Will (1917, App. Div.) 163
N. Y. Supp. 873.
'Authorities are cited in the opinion.
'For an analysis and criticism of the New York cases see article by Stewart
Chaplin, Incorporation by Reference (19o2) 2 COLUMBIA L REv. 148; also
Comment in (I904) I4YYALE LAW JouRBAL 226.
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CO ENTS
I all alike the judicial function is legislative as e l, and ith nothing
less ould e be content.
. L. C.
TESTAMENTARY POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
an a i l be so ra n s to provide that a power f appointment
created by it ay be effectively ercised by a erson ho does ot
survive the testator? is nusual and plex roble as pre-
sented to t e ew rk rt f ppeals in In r ll ( 918,
. .) u . . u.1
In contemplation f s iling the . d rs. o les
e ecuted t ir eral ills. " i ill r. o les e i ife
donee f a o er f int ent r i :' In t e event that
said ife and lf uld ie i ltaneously r er ch
circu stances s to r r it i i lt r ssi le t r ine
predeceased t t r, I r y l re it ill t t ll
dee ed t at I s ll r eceased ife, t t i
ill and a a ll f its r i i ll strued t e p-
ti n i t t ll r eceased id ife."
les r ill tt ted ise f
i t , ti
of the ill-fate ss l. r t i
vived t t r. t i t
rs. les t r ise t r
o rules f la r l i "st I)
ciple that a er r t ill r
dies before t e r's ill i ;2 )
the rule (i f rce i t
testator to incorporate r f r tri i t r
in character a t t e t
statutory for alities.s ll f t j itt
applicability of the first ri ci le. t j it
that r. les r t
intention to a i t e s s l t
such intention s l i ff t i
those ter s f rs. l s' ill
the power.~
1 cas i t l r i r rt i I r ld ill (1916, Surr.)
9S isc. 48, IS8 . . . S ; e les' ill ( 1
. . upp. 873-
• uthorities ar cit i t i i .
aFor an analysis and criticis f t cas se t
Chaplin, Incorporation y efere ce (1 0 ) 2 CoLU I . v. 148; also
t i (1 ) 1 Y JOU N .
• In speaking of the r l against i by r r J.,
